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THE UBS CASE: THE U.S. ATTACK ON SWISS 
BANKING SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Beckett G. Cantley* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 1, 2006, the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations (PSI), a branch of the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, released a report in conjunction with a Senate 
hearing that revealed alarming statistics regarding wealthy Americans’ 
love affair with offshore banking.1 The PSI report culminated in the 
subcommittee’s investigation into tax haven abuses, providing the most 
detailed look at high-level tax schemes to date.2 The report revealed that 
an alarming number of rich Americans are using offshore accounts to 
evade taxes, and suggested that law enforcement would be unable to 
control the growing misconduct.3 Senator Carl Levin, the PSI Chairman, 
stated, “The universe of offshore tax cheating has become so large that 
no one, not even the United States government, could go after it all.”4 
This investigation marked the first salvo of the federal government’s new 
attack on offshore tax evasion. The principal focus of this attack appears 
to be unreported offshore bank accounts.5 Due to its stringent banking 
laws and its stronghold on foreign money, Switzerland has historically 
been considered a bastion for banking secrecy, and a favorite place for 
U.S. residents to hold such accounts.6 While there is an existing tax 
information exchange agreement (TIEA) between the United States and 
                                                     
* Beckett G. Cantley (Univ. of Cal., Berkley, B.A. 1989; Southwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, J.D. cum 
laude, 1995; and Univ. of Fla., Coll. of Law, LL.M. in Taxation, 1997) is a Visiting Associate 
Professor of Law at Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School and a Professor of Law in the Diamond 
Program at Thomas Jefferson School of Law. Professor Cantley would like to thank Whitney 
Hodges for her work as a research assistant on this article. 
1 See generally PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND 
GOV’T AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY 
(2006) [hereinafter TAX HAVEN ABUSES] (released in conjunction with the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations Aug. 1, 2006 Hearing). 
2 David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at B2.  
3 See id. 
4 Id. 
5 See generally TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 1 (Many of the findings and recommendations 
focus on offshore activity, and the first section following the findings and recommendation is a 
report detailing “the Offshore Industry.”). 
6 See, e.g., Martin Crutsinger, U.S., Switzerland Agree to Crack Down on Tax Evaders, USA TODAY, 
June 20, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2009-06-19-us-switzerland-
tax-treaty_N.htm (“Swiss banks...hold an estimated $2 trillion dollars in foreign money, and 
financial services add about 12% to the country’s economic output. According to the Boston 
Consulting Group, these holdings total one-fourth of the world’s foreign-owned assets.”).  
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Switzerland—last significantly revised in 2003—a judicial battle has 
evolved over the United States’ new efforts to focus its attack on Swiss 
accounts and obtaining account-holder information from UBS.7  
The policy goals of the United States are clearly legitimate, but the 
means of obtaining the information are overreaching given how 
vigorously the United States guards its own legal exceptionalism. The 
Swiss are understandably concerned that the United States is not 
respecting Swiss domestic law. After all, the United States has personal 
jurisdiction over its own citizens; therefore, there should be better ways 
of obtaining this information while simultaneously respecting the 
domestic laws of another sovereign country, especially a friendly country 
such as Switzerland. This paper will dissect the intricacies and arguments 
surrounding the U.S. attack on offshore banking; discuss the U.S.-Swiss 
TIEA; and take a detailed look into the development, policy implications, 
and consequences of U.S. v. UBS AG.8  
II. IRS OFFSHORE ATTACK 
Especially in this time of economic turmoil, the government is 
concerned about billions of dollars of lost revenue from unpaid taxes.9 
Senator Carl Levin, as Chairman of the PSI, is the U.S. senator leading 
the investigations into offshore tax evasion. Not only do the offshore 
schemes targeted by Senator Levin and the PSI drastically reduce the 
U.S. government’s ability to monitor its citizens’ financial situations, but 
they also significantly increase the gap between taxes owed and taxes 
paid.10 The U.S. government has a strong interest in uncovering these 
schemes. According to Senator Levin, such schemes must be shut down 
because they undermine the integrity of the American tax system and 
render the government unable to “pay for critical needs, avoid going 
deeper into debt, and protect honest taxpayers.”11 Specifically, these tax 
schemes “[rob] the [U.S.] Treasury of more than $100 billion each year, 
                                                     
7 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-23-09, TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS AND ENTITIES, at 31-33 (2009) 
[hereinafter TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES] (scheduled for a Public Hearing before 
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means on Mar. 31, 
2009).  
8 U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), dismissed per 
stipulation, Agreement Between the U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009 WL 2524345 (2009).  
9 See generally id. (detailing the government’s effort to collect U.S.-source income tax relating to 
offshore accounts). 
10 Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for IRS: Testimony 
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Michael Brostek, Dir., Strategic 
Issues Team).  
11 Sen. Carl Levin, Statement Introducing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, Part I, TAX ANALYSTS, 
Feb. 12, 2007, at 1-2 [hereinafter Levin, Statement]. 
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and [shift] the tax burden from high income persons and companies onto 
the backs of middle income families.”12 Additionally, strict offshore 
secrecy rules, such as those implemented by Switzerland, “make it 
possible for taxpayers to participate in illicit activity with little fear of 
getting caught.”13 These laws permit offshore service providers to engage 
in procedures that allow them to go to “extraordinary lengths to protect 
their U.S. clients’ identities and financial information.”14 These “perks” 
hinder U.S. tax and regulatory authorities in such a way that it is 
“difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. law enforcement to get the 
information they need to enforce U.S. tax laws.”15  
At the G-20 summit in London on April 20, 2009, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany each sought to pressure 
financial centers worldwide to modify their banking secrecy laws.16 
While each country had its own reasons for exerting such pressure, this 
part of the paper focuses on the United States’ reasons for seeking to 
modify international banking secrecy laws. These reasons include the 
discovery of a scheme involving two billionaire brothers that gave 
credence to the concerns outlined in the 2006 PSI investigation,17 the 
government’s desire to rein in tax evaders through the Voluntary 
Disclosure Initiative,18 the inadequacy of international tax examinations 
and the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program to enforce tax 
compliance,19 and the existence of non-filers associated with foreign 
bank accounts.20 
A. The Case of the Billionaire Brothers 
In September 2006, Forbes ranked Samuel Wyly on its list of richest 
Americans.21 Forbes estimated Sam’s net worth to be around $1.1 billion, 
earned mostly from investments.22 Sam’s older brother Charles has a 
                                                     
12 See id. at 1. 
13 Id. at 5. 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Diana Erbsen et al., IRS Issues Voluntary Disclosure Guidance for Unreported Offshore Accounts 
and Entities, TAX UPDATE, Mar. 31, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/irs-issues-
new-voluntary-disclosure-guidance-for-unreported-offshore-accounts-and-entities/. 
17 See TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 1, at 113-360.  
18 Kristen A. Parillo, IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process, TAX ANALYSTS, July 30, 2009 
(Doc. 2009-17268) [hereinafter IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process]. 
19 See Brostek, supra note 10, at 7-11. 
20 See IRS, FAQs Regarding Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)—Filing 
Requirements, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=210244,00.html (last updated Apr. 
28, 2010).  
21 Special Report: The 400 Richest Americans, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2006), 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/54/biz_06rich400_The-400-Richest-Americans_Rank_15.html. 
22 Id.  
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personal portfolio almost equal to Sam’s.23 The Wyly brothers, who are 
Texan entrepreneurs, are notorious not only for their eye-popping wealth, 
but also for the multiple tax evasion investigations they have incurred by 
separate federal and state agencies.24  
In 2005, Michael’s Stores, Inc. released a statement conceding that 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York County 
District Attorney were investigating the stock transactions of the Wyly 
brothers, the company’s president and vice president.25 However, this 
charge was small compared to the investigation revealed in the 
previously mentioned 2006 PSI report.26 According to that investigation, 
early in the 1990s the brothers set about establishing fifty-eight offshore 
trusts and corporations, which they operated for more than thirteen years 
without alerting U.S. authorities.27 The brothers set up the trusts in the 
name of individual family members, and located them in the Isle of 
Man—a noted tax haven.28 To move funds abroad, the brothers 
transferred over $190 million in stock option compensation from 
publicly traded U.S. companies to offshore corporations, Michael’s being 
only one of many.29 When confronted about the staggering amount of 
untaxed money, the billionaire brothers “claimed that they did not have 
to pay tax on this compensation because, in exchange [for their 
investments], the offshore corporations provided them with private 
annuities which would not begin to make payments to them until years 
later.”30 Meanwhile, the brothers were having their options cashed in and 
the proceeds invested without disclosing the transactions to the SEC.31  
The PSI traced “more than $700 million in [untaxed] stock option 
proceeds that the brothers invested in various ventures they controlled, 
including two hedge funds, an energy company, and an offshore 
insurance firm.”32 To add insult to injury, the brothers also used the 
                                                     
23 Katie Fairbank & Sudeep Reddy, Billionaire Brothers Under a Microscope: They’re Known for 
Gifts to Charities, Politics, but Tax Shelters Scrutinized, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 26, 
2006, available at http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/08/27/1832755.htm. 
24 Press Release, Democratic Nat’l Comm., Another Bad Batch of Bush Money (June 6, 2005) 
(available from ProQuest); Brendan M. Case, Selling Secret Accounts Draws Scrutiny: Senate 
Report Blasts Dallas Firm for Offshore Services for the Masses, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Aug. 13, 2006, (available from ProQuest) (stating that the brothers are being investigated by the 
SEC, a grand jury in Dallas, and a grand jury in New York). 
25 See Democratic  Nat’l Comm., supra note 24. 
26 See TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 1, at 113-360 (providing extensive background and details of 
the Wyly case). 
27 See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 3. 
28 See Democratic Nat’l Comm., supra note 24. 
29 See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 3. 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.; see TAX HAVEN ABUSES, supra note 1, at 118. 
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offshore trusts to allocate $600 million of untaxed dollars to purchase 
real estate, jewelry, and artwork for themselves and family members.33 
These personal purchases were made under the pretense that the brothers 
“could use offshore dollars to advance their personal and business 
interests without having to pay any taxes on the offshore income.”34 The 
Wyly brothers were able to carry on these evasive and manipulative tax 
maneuvers largely because all of their activity was shielded by the 
offshore country’s domestic secrecy laws and practices.35  
Despite their funds being offshore, the Wylys directly controlled all 
the accounts and assets.36 “[T]he brothers and their representatives 
communicated [their] directives to a so-called trust protector who then 
relayed these directions to the offshore trustees.”37 These trustees never 
rejected a Wyly order nor initiated any action without the brothers’ 
approval.38 Senator Levin explained that it was simple for these 
billionaire brothers to take advantage of a practice dubbed the “Foreign 
Trust Loophole.”39  The Wylys’ offshore trustees had “discretion” to 
name beneficiaries of the offshore trusts, which were, for paperwork 
purposes, companies in the trustees’ countries.40 However, the 
application of this discretion had already been determined, since the 
trustees had been informed that trust assets were to go to the Wyly 
children upon the death of their respective fathers.41 The trustees also 
knew they could be replaced if they failed to comply with the Wylys’ 
instructions.42 Additionally, in accordance with the trust protector’s 
orders, the trustees authorized millions of dollars in trust income to be 
invested in Wyly businesses and used to purchase personal property for 
the Wyly family.43 
                                                     
33 Kelly Fraser & Leah Graboski, “U” Donor Investigated for Tax-Evasion Report, THE MICHIGAN 
DAILY, Aug. 6, 2006, available at http://www.michigandaily.com/content/u-donor-investigated-tax-
evasion-report; see Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 3.  
34 See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 3. 
35 Id.  
36 See id. at 3-4. 
37 See id. at 6.  
38 See id. 
39 Id. at 15; Will Deener, Probe of Offshore Investments Expanding, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
June 4, 2005 (available from ProQuest) (describing the Wylys’ tax evasion scheme thus: “First a 
public company grants stock options to a senior executive. The executive then transfers the options 
to a trust or partnership controlled by the executive’s family. The parties then structure the transfer 
as a ‘sale’ and the trust then ‘pays’ the executive for the options with a long-term or deferred 
note…Shortly after the options are transferred, the trust exercises the stock options and sells the 
stock in the open market. The executive then takes the position that tax is not owed until the date of 
the deferred payment…although the executive has access to the partnership assets.”). 
40 See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 15. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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When called by the PSI in 2006, Sam and Charles Wyly stated they 
would each invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and thus were not asked to testify.44 A statement released 
by the billionaire brothers’ attorney, William Brewer, insisted that Sam 
and Charles were innocent, stating, “The Wylys believe they have paid 
all taxes due.”45 
B. Non-Filers with Foreign Bank Accounts 
Every United States person who has one or more foreign bank 
account(s) that at any point during the year reaches an aggregate balance 
of over $10,000 is obligated to file a report with the United States 
Department of Treasury listing all foreign accounts.46 Under this 
regulation, a “United States person” is any of the following: (1) a citizen 
or resident of the United States; (2) a domestic partnership; (3) a 
domestic corporation; or (4) a domestic estate or trust.47 “Financial 
accounts” include bank accounts, brokerage accounts, mutual funds, 
securities, derivatives, financial instrument accounts, and debit and 
prepaid credit cards maintained with a financial institution.48 U.S. 
investors in offshore hedge funds and private equity funds are also 
required to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts 
(FBAR).49 
                                                     
44 See Johnston, supra note 2, at B2.  
45 Id. (also stating: “And in, any event, as the [PSI] report makes clear, the Wylys were counseled by 
an armada of lawyers, brokers, financial professionals, and offshore service providers to ensure that 
they were at all times fully meeting their obligations.”). 
46 Memorandum from IRS on Report on Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (June 30, 2009), 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=148849,00.html. 
47 Id.; Recent Developments Encourage Voluntary Correction of Foreign Financial Bank Account 
Reporting Violations, MCDERMOTT NEWSL. (McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Int’l.), Apr. 14, 2009, 
available at http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/6eb0672c-
de23-4242-9312-888af6760b4b.cfm [hereinafter MCDERMOTT NEWSL.] (stating that “[a] United 
States person has a ‘financial interest’ in each account for which such person is the owner of record 
or has legal title, regardless of whether the account is maintained for the persons’ own benefit or for 
the benefit of others (including non-United States persons). The instructions [on the FBAR form] 
now provide that the owner of record or holder of legal title includes a corporation in which the 
United States person owns directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of the total value or more than 
50 percent of the voting power for all shares of stock, and a partnership in which the United States 
person owns an interest in more than 50 percent of the profits or more than 50 percent of the capital 
of the partnership.”). 
48 IRS, Form TD 90-22.1 at 6, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f90221.pdf (stating this 
includes savings, demand, checking, and deposit accounts, or any other account maintained with a 
financial institution); see MCDERMOTT NEWSL., supra note 47 (“[I]ndividual bonds, notes or stock 
certificates and an unsecured loan to a foreign trade or business that is not a financial institution, are 
not financial accounts…[C]orrespondent or ‘nostro’ accounts (international interbank transfer 
accounts) maintained by banks that are used solely for the purpose of bank-to-bank settlement are 
also not considered financial account for these purposes.”). 
49 Kristen A. Parillo, Hedge Fund Investors Must File FBAR, IRS Confirms, TAX ANALYSTS, June 
29, 2009 (Doc. 2009-14609) at 18 (stating there has been confusion over the rules in recent years). 
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The failure to file an FBAR or to disclose foreign accounts can lead 
to significant civil and criminal penalties.50 Civilly, a person can be fined 
up to $10,000 for non-willful noncompliance and up to the greater of 
$100,000 or fifty percent of the amount of the underlying account’s 
balance at the time of the violation if the noncompliance is determined to 
be willful.51 A person can be criminally prosecuted and fined either up to 
$250,000 and imprisoned for five years or, if the violation occurred in 
tandem with any other U.S. law violation, the individual will be fined 
$500,000 and imprisoned for ten years.52 The penalties are also 
applicable if a person supplies false information or omits information.53 
While the statute authorizes the assessment of the maximum penalty 
for violations, the IRS adopted revised FBAR penalty guidelines in July 
2008 in an attempt to encourage non-filers to come forward.54 Under this 
revision, if the failure to have previously filed the required FBAR was 
not “willful,” and the threshold conditions were met, the guidelines 
suggest penalties ranging from $5,000 to $15,000, depending on the 
particular amounts.55 If a “willful” non-filer meets the same threshold 
conditions, penalties can range from five percent to fifty percent of the 
maximum balance in the particular account for the year in question.56 
The Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, mentioned above, was an additional 
IRS step aimed at bringing non-filers into the fold by offering reduced 
penalties.57 
C. Other IRS Offshore Enforcement Issues 
                                                     
50 Client Alerts, Cooley LLP, Foreign Account Disclosure: Possible June 30 Filing Obligation for 
Certain Funds and LPs, TAX UPDATE, June 2009, available at http://www.cooley.com/62717 
[hereinafter Foreign Account Disclosure]. 
51 Workbook on the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=159757,00.html#penalties (last updated Mar. 30, 
2010). 
52 Id.  
53 See Foreign Account Disclosure, supra note 50, at 2. 
54 Philip T. Pasmanik & Neil J. Sullivan, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts: 
Significant Revisions and Severe Penalties, THE TAX ADVISER, July 2009, at 462 (on file with 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); see MCDERMOTT NEWSL., supra note 47 
(explaining that the new guidelines have given clarity to those considering voluntary disclosure on 
how to proceed).  
55 See MCDERMOTT NEWSL., supra note 47 (“The threshold conditions are as follows: “[1] The 
person does not have a history of past FBAR penalty assessments…; [2] The money passed through 
any of the foreign accounts associated with the person was not from an illegal source nor used to 
further a criminal purpose; [3] The person cooperated during the examination…; and [4] The IRS 
did not sustain a civil fraud penalty against the person for an underpayment of taxes for the year in 
question due to the failure to report income related to any amount in the foreign account.”). 
56 Id. 
57 See id.  
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Despite the Voluntary Disclosure Initiative and several other IRS 
initiatives targeting offshore tax schemes, tax evasion and fraudulent 
crimes involving offshore entities remain difficult to detect and 
prosecute.58 Abusive and evasive offshore tax schemes present 
challenges related to the oversight of foreign accounts, the enforcement 
of myriad tax laws, the complexity of offshore financial transactions and 
relationships among entities, the lack of jurisdictional authority to pursue 
information, the specificity of information necessitated by information-
sharing agreements, and the difficulties obtaining information from third-
party financial institutions.59 This Section specifically addresses IRS time 
constraints, the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program, and the pending 
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act in Congress.  
A major issue for agency enforcement policy is the time constraint 
the IRS faces when conducting examinations that include offshore tax 
issues.60 By and large, offshore examinations take much longer than do 
their domestic counterparts.61 A 2009 U.S. Government Accountability 
Office report shows that offshore examinations take, on average, five 
hundred more calendar days to develop and examine than do domestic 
audits.62 Reasons behind this lag include, but are not limited to, technical 
complexity and difficulty accessing information from foreign sources.63 
Despite the extra time required, offshore examinations have the same 
statute of limitations as domestic examinations, which prevents the IRS 
from assessing taxes or penalties more than three years after a return is 
filed.64 This often leads to the IRS prematurely ending an offshore 
examination or choosing not to open one at all, despite evidence of likely 
noncompliance.65 IRS Commissioner Shulman testified that it would be 
helpful for Congress to extend the statute of limitations from three years 
to six years to assess offshore tax liability.66 However, Congress has yet 
to codify this request.67 
Another problem for the IRS is the Qualified Intermediary (QI) 
program.68 While it is an effective program where properly utilized, it is 
                                                     
58 Brostek, supra note 10, at 7. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 8. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 9. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 10; see also TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 22-25 (“A 
QI is defined as a foreign financial institution or a foreign clearing organization, other than a U.S. 
branch or U.S. office of such institution or organization, which has entered into a withholding and 
reporting agreement (QI agreement) with the IRS. In exchange for entering into a QI agreement, the 
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insufficient to address all instances of offshore tax evasion.69 Michael 
Brostek explains, “Under the QI program, foreign financial institutions 
voluntarily report to the IRS income earned and taxes withheld on U.S. 
source income, providing some assurance that taxes for U.S. source 
income sent offshore are properly withheld and income is properly 
reported.”70 Unfortunately, significant gaps exist in the information 
available to the IRS about offshore account owners.71 Additionally, a low 
percentage of U.S. source income sent offshore flows through QIs.72 In 
2003, for example, only about twelve percent of $293 billion in U.S. 
income flowed through QIs.73 The rest—about $256 billion—flowed 
through U.S. withholding agents, who, unlike QIs that are required to 
verify account owners’ identities, are permitted to accept at face value 
account owners’ self-certification of their identities.74 The reliance on 
self-certification leads to a greater potential for improper withholding 
because of misinformation or fraud.75 
Due to the extensive number of problems facing the IRS in offshore 
tax enforcement, Commissioner Shulman has conceded that “[t]here is 
general agreement in the tax administration community that there is no 
‘silver bullet’ or one strategy that will alone solve the problems of 
offshore tax avoidance.”76 However, despite this grim reality, the IRS has 
pursued a number of avenues to get a handle on the situation.77 The 
Senate and the House of Representatives have introduced identical bills, 
each entitled the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act.78 These bills were in the 
                                                                                                                       
QI is able to shield the identities of its customers from the IRS and other intermediaries…in certain 
circumstances and is subject to reduced information reporting duties compared to those that would 
be imposed in the absence of the agreement. This ability to shield customer information is limited, 
however, with respect to U.S. persons, because the QI is required to furnish Forms 1099 to its U.S. 
customers if it has assumed primary withholdings responsibility for these accounts, or to provide 
Forms W-9 to the withholding agent in cases in which the QI has not assumed such responsibility.”). 
69 Brostek, supra note 10, at para. 1. 
70 Id. at 10. 
71 See id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. (stating that the UBS cases—discussed later in this paper—demonstrate how QIs are 
insufficient to eliminate offshore tax evasion).  
76 Id. at 11. 
77 See id. 
78 See generally Press Release, Sen. Carl Levin, Summary of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (Mar. 
2, 2009), http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=308949 (Senate Bill 506 and House Bill 
1265, proposing to, inter alia, (1) allow the Department of Treasury to impose the same penalties 
used when an institution, foreign jurisdiction, or individual is found to be laundering money to any 
transaction or entity that the Treasury finds to be impeding on U.S. tax enforcement; (2) authorize 
the Secretary of the Treasury to add or remove countries from the list of offshore secrecy 
jurisdictions, which are viewed as having secrecy laws or practices that unreasonably restrict U.S. 
tax authorities from obtaining necessary information; (3) cause certain non-U.S. corporations, which 
are managed and controlled within the United States, to be treated as domestic corporations and 
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committee stage of both Congressional Houses, which is the first step in 
the legislative process, but as of February 2011 had not become law.79 
On its end, the IRS has “both increased the number of [international 
audits since November 2008] and prioritized the stepped-up hiring of 
international experts and investigators.”80 The IRS is also “exploring 
how to improve information reporting and sharing.”81 Because QI allows 
important insight into the activities of U.S. taxpayers at foreign banks 
and financial institutions, the IRS is continuously looking at how to 
improve the QI program.82   
D. The Voluntary Disclosure Initiative 
The IRS has long had a voluntary disclosure practice, under which 
taxpayers may voluntarily disclose non-compliance.83 Although this 
practice creates no substantive rights for the taxpayer, it is one factor for 
the IRS to consider in determining whether to criminally prosecute the 
taxpayer.84 On March 23, 2009, the IRS, in line with the government’s 
growing resistance to continued tax evasion as highlighted by the case of 
the billionaire brothers,85 announced a new, temporary initiative 
specifically targeted at offshore accounts that they hoped would 
encourage tax evaders to return to legal activity.86 This new program, 
called the Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, significantly lowered the 
penalties for unpaid taxes for those individuals or companies that 
                                                                                                                       
liable for U.S. corporate income tax; and (4) apply withholding tax to payments with respect to stock 
of U.S. corporations to non-U.S. persons of dividend-equivalent amounts and substituted dividends, 
which are, arguably, not subject to the 30% withholding tax on dividends paid to non-U.S. 
investors).  
79 Jennie Cherry & Rashad Wareh, IRS Increases Focus on Offshore Tax Matter, TAX UPDATE (June 
4, 2009) (Int’l Law Offices), available at 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=330dfbdb-d3e7-48da-bf56-
d08c1ee10f20; see GovTrack, S. 506 [111th]: Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-506 and GovTrack, H.R. 1265 [111th]: Stop Tax 
Haven Abuse Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1265 (stating that these bills 
never became law because the sessions expired before they were enacted).  
80 Tax Issues Related to Ponzi Schemes and an Update on Offshore Tax Evasion Legislation: 
Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Doug Shulman, IRS 
Comm’r). 
81 See id. at 6.  
82 Id. (stating these enhancements include expanding information reporting requirements to include 
sources of income for U.S. persons with accounts at QI banks, strengthening documentation rules to 
ensure that the program is delivering on its original intent, and requiring withholding accounts with 
documentation that is considered insufficient).  
83 See Revised IRS Voluntary Disclosure Practice, Tax Crimes General, IRM 9.5.11.9 (June 26, 
2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=104361,00.html [hereinafter IRM]. 
84 Id. 
85 See supra Part II.A. 
86 IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process, supra note 18. 
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voluntarily disclosed their offshore accounts.87 The program took effect 
on March 23, 2009, and initially terminated on September 23, 2009.88 It 
was available for all taxpayers with legal source income who made 
timely, accurate, and complete disclosures to the IRS, satisfying the 
requirements of the Internal Revenue Manual, and paid—or arranged to 
pay—the taxes due.89  
The IRS’s intent was two-fold.90 First, the IRS hoped to incentivize 
noncompliant, eligible taxpayers to become compliant by setting forth a 
favorable penalty framework.91 Second, the government hoped to recoup 
the lost tax revenue.92 The policy goals behind the initiative included 
providing predictable and effective rules to deal with the potentially large 
class of noncompliant U.S. taxpayers using offshore accounts without 
proper disclosure or tax payments, reducing the difficulty of obtaining 
information from offshore banking countries, and satisfying requests for 
certainty from tax professionals.93  
To reach the agency’s goals, IRS personnel could now apply a new 
penalty framework to voluntary disclosure requests of previously 
unreported offshore entities and accounts.94 Under the new Voluntary 
Disclosure Initiative, the IRS would assess taxes and interest for the six 
years prior the voluntary disclosure.95 The taxpayers who took advantage 
of the program were required to go back and file or amend all returns for 
the applicable period, including filing the FBAR.96 The IRS would assess 
penalties, including accuracy or delinquency penalties, on taxes that 
                                                     
87 See id. 
88 Id.  
89 Erbsen et al., supra note 16, at 2; IRM, supra note 83 (stating: “(3) A voluntary 
disclosure occurs when the communication is truthful, timely, complete, and when: a. the 
taxpayer shows a willingness to cooperate (and does in fact cooperate) with the IRS in 
determining his or her correct tax liability; and b. the taxpayer makes good faith 
arrangements with the IRS to pay in full, the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by 
the IRS to be applicable. (4) A disclosure is timely if it received before: a. the IRS has 
initiated a civil examination or criminal investigation of the taxpayer, or has notified the 
taxpayer that it intends to commence such an examination or investigation; b. the IRS has 
received information from a third party (e.g., informant, other governmental agency, or the 
media) alerting the IRS to the specific taxpayer’s noncompliance; c. the IRS has initiated a 
civil examination or criminal investigation which is directly related to the specific liability 
of the taxpayer; or d. the IRS has acquired information directly related to the specific 
liability of the taxpayer from a criminal enforcement action (e.g., search warrant, grand 
jury subpoena).”). 
90 Erbsen et al., supra note 16, at 3. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 2. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. (“except where an account or an entity was formed or acquired within the six-year look-back 
period, in which case taxes and interest will be assessed starting with the earliest year in which the 
account was opened or acquired, or an entity was formed”).  
96 Id.  
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should have been reported, unless there was reasonable cause to support 
the discrepancy.97 The sole penalty that would apply would be a penalty 
equal to twenty percent of the foreign account balances in the year in 
which the balances were at their highest.98 The penalty could be reduced 
to five percent in the case of certain inherited accounts.99  
The temporary program, like the ongoing voluntary disclosure 
practice, does not guarantee immunity from prosecution, but it is one of 
the best methods for taxpayers to minimize the likelihood of criminal 
penalties.100 For cases involving unreported offshore income in which the 
taxpayer did not use the Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, the IRS is 
“instructing [the] agents to fully develop the case pursuing both civil and 
criminal penalties, including the maximum penalty for the willful failure 
to file an FBAR report and the fraud penalty.”101  
In conjunction with this program, the IRS posted a form to its 
website that allowed taxpayers to provide the necessary information to be 
considered for the Voluntary Disclosure Initiative.102 According to Bruce 
Friedland, IRS spokesman, this form was designed to streamline the 
process and cut down on the back-and-forth among taxpayers, their 
advisers, and the IRS regarding what information is required.103 The 
implementation of this form appears to have paid off, as the IRS is 
pleased with the initiative’s response.104 Friedland stated that during the 
week of July 20, 2009 alone, the IRS received more than four hundred 
                                                     
97 Id. (explaining that an accuracy penalty is twenty percent of the understatement of the tax and a 
delinquency penalty is up to twenty-five percent of the net tax required to be shown on the tax 
return).  
98 Id. at 3. 
99 Id. (providing the conditions that must be satisfied to qualify for a reduction, including “(1) the 
taxpayer did not open or cause any accounts to be opened or entities formed; (2) there has been no 
activity in any account or entity; and (3) all applicable U.S. taxes have been paid on the funds 
deposited in the accounts or transferred to the entities (except for taxes on income or earnings of the 
account of entity)”).  
100Id. at 2; IRM, supra note 83, at subparagraph (2) (this does not apply to a taxpayer with an illegal 
income source). 
101 Statement, Douglas Shulman, IRS Comm’r, Conference Call Regarding Voluntary Disclosure 
Initiative, (Mar. 26, 2009) (transcript on file with the author) (stating: “Those who truly come in 
voluntarily will pay back taxes, interest, and a significant penalty, but can avoid jail time.”). 
102 IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process, supra note 18; Memorandum from IRS on 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosures—Optional Format (July 29, 2009) (on file with agency) (the three-
page form asks the taxpayer to (1) provide an explanation of the source of the offshore funds; (2) 
disclose whether he/she is currently under audit or criminal investigation by the IRS; (3) estimate the 
highest aggregate foreign account value and the total reported income for 2003-2008; and (4) list 
where the account or asset was located and when the account was opened or closed; (5) explain the 
purpose for establishing the account or asset; (6) list each person or entity affiliated with the account 
and explain the nature of its relationship to the account; and (7) explain all communications with the 
financial institution regarding the account or asset).  
103 Memorandum from IRS on Offshore Voluntary Disclosures, supra note 102. 
104 See id.  
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requests to participate in the program.105 This number represents more 
than four times the total number of requests received during 2008 in its 
entirety.106 
III. THE U.S.-SWISS TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
AGREEMENTS 
A Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) is a bilateral 
agreement between two sovereign countries governing a mutual 
exchange of information.107 The goals behind the United States’ initiation 
of its tax information exchange program were to assure the accurate 
assessment and collection of taxes, to prevent fiscal fraud and tax 
evasion, and to develop improved sources for tax matters in general.108  
The United States entered a TIEA with Switzerland—a powerhouse 
in offshore banking—effective December 19, 1997.109 Article 26 of The 
Convention Between the United States and Swiss Confederation for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income 
(Convention) provided that the authorities of the two countries would 
exchange tax information as necessary for the “prevention of tax fraud or 
the like in relation to taxes which are subject …” to the Convention.110 
This exchange of information included both civil and criminal matters.111 
This Section looks at the 2003 changes to the Convention112 followed by 
a discussion of the policy behind updating the TIEA.113 
A. The 2003 Changes 
                                                     
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 See TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 54. 
108 See id. at 55.  
109 See Client Alert, Baker & McKenzie LLP, Switzerland and United States Sign Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement, (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/4938F894-
564E-45D8-8DD5-
07A5E7D5FCDE/29591/SWITZERLANDANDUNITEDSTATESSIGNTAXINFOEXCHAN.pdf 
[hereinafter Tax Information Exchange Agreement]. 
110 Id. at 1.  
111 See id.  
112 Press Release, U.S Dep’t of the Treas., Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the 
Admin. of Article 26 (Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of 
October 2, 1996,  (Jan. 23, 2003) available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/mutual.aspx [hereinafter Mutual Agreement]; see generally Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement, supra note 109 (outlining changes to the Convention). 
113 See Tax Information Exchange Agreement, supra note 109, at 1; see generally Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treas., Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Announces Mutual Agreement with 
Switzerland Regarding Tax Information Exchange (Jan. 24, 2009) available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/kd3795.aspx (including the text of the 
Mutual Agreement, Letter from Acting Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam, and Letter from Swiss Fin. 
Minister Kaspar Villiger).  
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Controversy surrounded the definition of “tax fraud” almost 
immediately upon inception of the Convention.114 Under Swiss law, tax 
fraud generally occurs only when documents are forged or falsified, or 
when there is a scheme of lies to deceive tax authorities.115 The United 
States has a more liberal view of what tax fraud entails, including things 
such as the failure to file a tax return or omission of certain income from 
a return.116 The changes employed under the 2003 mutual agreement lean 
toward the more liberal American view.117 
On January 23, 2003, the U.S. and Swiss authorities entered into a 
mutual agreement that established new guidelines on how to properly 
implement the Convention.118 The agreement was intended to clarify 
what behaviors constituted “tax fraud” by outlining fourteen hypothetical 
situations where tax fraud is recognized.119 This list was not meant to be 
exhaustive and only provides basic guidelines for each country’s 
constituents and financial institutions.120 The countries also agreed upon 
six “understandings.”121 The first understanding emphasizes both 
countries’ renewed efforts to work together to the greatest extent possible 
to support the tax administration of both countries.122 The second 
understanding states that when information is requested, the statute of 
limitation of the requesting party applies.123 The third understanding 
allows information to be requested for both criminal and civil 
penalties.124 The fourth understanding sets forth three examples, provided 
for in the original agreement, that establish when a country can request 
information if it is believed or suspected that there is tax fraud being 
committed.125 The fifth understanding stipulates that each country will 
share information when the other country has a “reasonable suspicion” 
that certain conduct would constitute fraud.126 The sixth understanding 
                                                     
114 See Tax Information Exchange Agreement, supra note 109, at 1. 
115 Id.  
116 See id.  
117 See id. at 2. 
118 U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., supra note 113. 
119 See Mutual Agreement, supra note 112, at 3-10.  
120 See id. 
121 Id. at 1-2. 
122 Id. at 1. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1-2. 
125 Id. at 2; Tax Information Exchange Agreement, supra note 109, at 1 (these examples include “(a) 
conduct established to defraud individuals or companies, even though the aim of the behavior may 
not be to commit tax fraud; (b) conduct that involves destruction or non-production of records, or the 
failure to prepare or maintain correct and complete records; [and] (c) conduct by a person subject to 
tax in the requesting State that involves the failure to file a tax return that such person is under a 
legal duty to file, or an affirmative act that has the effect of deceiving the tax authorities”). 
126 Mutual Agreement, supra note 112, at 2. 
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states that these preceding examples will constitute tax fraud under 
Article 26 of the Convention.127 
 
B. Policy Behind Updating the TIEA 
TIEAs, entered into mutually, can foster advantageous symbiotic 
relationships.128 Many countries, including the United States and 
countries within the European Union, believe that Switzerland is a 
hotbed for maintaining abusive tax avoidance, and that its secrecy laws 
prevent other countries from effectively combating tax fraud.129  Changes 
to the agreement could help Switzerland shake off the recent bad press 
regarding how its secrecy laws are causing other countries to lose 
hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenue.130 Instead of vigorously 
prosecuting offshore fund holders, a renewed faith in the Swiss banking 
system could encourage other countries to promote offshore banking, 
allowing Switzerland to maintain its status as an epicenter of banking.131 
Concurrently, updates to the convention will help the United States 
increase its surveillance abilities, assist in closing its tax gap, fulfill its 
TIEA program goals, and recoup millions in lost tax revenue.132  
Enacted changes could facilitate more effective tax information 
exchange between the United States and Switzerland.133 However, 
despite intentions to improve information sharing, changes may affect 
how business in Switzerland is run with respect to U.S. and other foreign 
taxpayers. Any change has the potential to disrupt the cultural landscape 
of a country that prides itself on banking secrecy and financial security.  
IV. THE UBS CASE 
UBS AG (UBS), based in Switzerland, is one of the largest financial 
institutions worldwide.134 Effective January 1, 2001, UBS voluntarily 
entered into a QI agreement with the IRS.135 Like in most U.S. QI 
agreements, UBS agreed to identify and document any customers who 
held U.S. investments or received U.S. source income in accounts 
                                                     
127 Id. 
128 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., supra note 113. 
129 See Andrea Coombes, UBS Case Could Be Major Victory for IRS, MARKETWATCH.COM, July 11, 
2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ubs-case-could-be-major-victory-for-irs. 
130 See id.  
131 Id. 
132 See id. 
133 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., supra note 113. 
134 See TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 2. 
135 Id. at 31; Brostek, supra note 10, at 10. 
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maintained with UBS.136 If a U.S. customer refused to be identified under 
the QI agreement, UBS was required to apply a backup withholding tax 
at a twenty-eight percent rate on payments made to the customer.137 
Further, UBS was to bar the customer from holding any U.S. 
investments.138 Eventually, UBS failed to uphold its end of the agreement 
and the U.S. government felt compelled to bring judicial action.139 
This Section addresses why UBS became the linchpin in the U.S. 
attack on bank accounts promoting tax evasion.140 It outlines the 
procedure taken against the bank in terms of both criminal and civil 
judicial action141 and the policy issues surrounding the litigation.142 
Finally, this Section dissects the outcome of the most current civil 
litigation facing UBS.143 
A. Why UBS? 
On July 17, 2008, the PSI, still adamantly focused on the fight 
against tax evasion, released a staff report entitled Tax Haven Banks and 
U.S. Tax Compliance (2008 PSI Report).144 This report, as damning to 
U.S. offshore tax enforcement as was the 2006 PSI report, revealed that 
many of UBS’s American clients refused either to be identified, to have 
taxes withheld, or to sell their U.S. assets as required under the standing 
2001 QI agreement.145 In order to retain the high volume of wealthy U.S. 
customers, UBS bankers assisted the U.S. taxpayers in concealing the 
ownership identity of the assets held in offshore accounts by helping to 
create nominee and sham entities in various non-U.S. jurisdictions. These 
entities were then claimed to not be subject to reporting requirements 
specified under the QI agreement.146 The report alleges that UBS not 
only assisted in these tax-evasion schemes, but also purposefully 
                                                     
136 See TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 31. 
137 See id. 
138 Id. 
139 U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), dismissed per 
stipulation, Agreement Between the U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009 WL 2524345 (2009). See 
generally STAFF REPORT, S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, Tax Haven Banks and 
U.S. Tax Compliance, (2008) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT] (released in conjunction with the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations July 17, 2008 Hearing). 
140 See generally Brostek, supra, note 10; STAFF REPORT, supra note 139. 
141 See generally Brostek, supra, note 10; STAFF REPORT, supra note 139. 
142 See Pascal Fletcher & Lisa Jucca, UBS, U.S. Settle Tax Evasion Case, REUTERS, Aug. 12, 2009, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/12/ubs-tax-idUSN129606820090812.  
143 See id. 
144 See generally STAFF REPORT, supra note 139.  
145 Id. at 10. 
146 Id. 
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marketed the strategies to wealthy Americans.147 The 2008 PSI report 
documented that the United States loses around $100 billion annually to 
offshore tax evasion.148 According to the U.S. Senate and U.S. 
Department of Justice prosecutor’s investigation, U.S. clients hold about 
nineteen thousand accounts at UBS, containing an estimated $18-20 
billion in assets.149 
Shortly following the release of this information, Bradley Birkenfeld, 
an American citizen and a UBS Geneva-based director of wealthy 
American clients with offshore accounts from 2002-2006, pleaded guilty 
to the charge of helping American billionaire Igor Olenicoff evade 
millions of dollars in federal taxes.150 Birkenfeld’s testimony 
compounded UBS’s precarious situation.151 Specifically, the former 
director testified that UBS bankers used a variety of ruses to court 
American clients and to help them dodge taxes.152 UBS advised bankers 
traveling to the United States to tell airport customs agents that the trip 
was for pleasure and not business.153 Additionally, the bank urged clients 
to destroy banking records to conceal their offshore accounts.154 Some 
American clients were even instructed to “stash” watches, jewelry, and 
artwork bought with money hidden offshore.155 UBS went so far as to 
encourage clients to use Swiss credit cards so the IRS could not track 
purchases.156 Birkenfeld further stated that in his official position he 
served as a courier for his clients, getting checks out of the United States 
and depositing them in accounts in Denmark, Switzerland, and 
Liechtenstein.157 He testified that he knew he was breaking the law but 
did so because of the “incentives” UBS offered him.158 Birkenfeld’s 
cooperation with the government in the formative stages of the UBS case 
was vital to the U.S. Federal Government’s tax evasion inquiry.159  
B. The Case 
                                                     
147 See id. at 17; Evan Perez, Moving the Market: Offshore Tax Evasion Costs U.S. $100 Billion, 
Senate Probe of UBS, LGT Indicates, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2008, at C3. 
148 See Perez, supra note 147. 
149 STAFF REPORT, supra note 139. 
150 Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Please Guilty in Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at 
C1. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 Id.   
156 Id.   
157 See id.  
158 Id. (stating these incentives came in the form of large bonuses). 
159 See id. (“Birkenfeld’s testimony, the centerpiece of a widening investigation into UBS and its 
wealthy American clients, blew a hole in the wall of secrecy surrounding the world of Swiss 
banking.”). 
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A little less than a month prior to the 2008 PSI report’s release, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation made a formal request to travel to 
Switzerland to probe a multi-million dollar tax evasion case involving 
UBS.160 The UBS fallout subsequently progressed at a furious pace.161 At 
the 2008 PSI hearing, held in conjunction with the 2008 PSI Report, 
Mark Branson, CFO of UBS Global Wealth Management and Business 
Banking, testified that, in fact, compliance failures might have occurred 
at UBS.162 He pledged that UBS would take progressive action to ensure 
that the activities identified in the 2008 PSI Report would not 
continue.163 He stated that UBS would no longer provide offshore 
banking services to U.S. customers.164 Instead, such customers would 
only be provided services through U.S.-licensed companies.165 
Additionally, UBS would no longer permit Swiss-based advisors to 
travel to the United States to meet with U.S. customers.166 Branson 
further pledged that UBS would comply with a John Doe summons 
relating to the UBS accounts held by U.S. residents.167 
The following day, on July 18, 2008, a federal district court in 
Florida granted the IRS permission to issue a John Doe summons to UBS 
seeking the names of as many as twenty thousand U.S. citizens who were 
UBS customers that failed to meet reporting or withholding 
obligations.168 However, UBS’s legal troubles did not end there.169 
Through a press release, UBS confirmed on November 12, 2008, that 
Raoul Weil, Chairman and CEO of UBS Global Wealth Management 
                                                     
160 Ass’n of Fin. Prof., FBI to Probe Swiss Bank in UBS Tax Dodging Case, (June 22, 2008), 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jTfwAG7pDZAUUS8_feZQgnnHAeaQ. 
161 See Lynnley Browning, A 2nd Inquiry Hits UBS, Pressed for 52,000 Names, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
2009, at B1 [hereinafter Browning, A 2nd Inquiry Hits UBS]; Andrew R. Sorkin, U.S. Sues UBS to 
Disclose Customers Names, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, http://dealbook. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/us-sues-ubs-to-disclose-customer-names/. 
162 United States Senate: Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance, Testimony before the S. 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 
(2008) (statement of Mark Branson, CFO of UBS Global Wealth Mgmt. & Swiss Bank Member of 
the Grp. Managing Bd.). 
163 See id. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
167 Id. 
168 See Levin, Statement, supra note 11, at 17 (explaining that a John Doe summons is a tool used by 
the IRS in recent years to uncover taxpayers in offshore tax schemes. It is an administrative IRS 
summons used to request information in cases where the identity of the taxpayer is unknown. To 
obtain approval of the summons, due to the IRS’s inability to serve the taxpayer, the IRS must show 
the court, in public filings to be resolved in open court, that: (1) the summons relates to a particular 
person or ascertainable class of persons, (2) there is a reasonable basis for concluding that there is a 
tax compliance issue involving that person or class of persons, and (3) the information sought is not 
readily available from other sources.).  
169 Press Release, UBS AG, Statement on Indictment of UBS Executive (Nov. 11, 2008), available 
at http://www.ubs.com/1/e/investors/releases?newsId=157836. 
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and Business Banking and member of the Group Executive Board, was 
indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in 
connection with the U.S. Department of Justice’s ongoing investigation 
of UBS’s U.S. cross-border business.170 Weil was subsequently relieved 
of his position with the company.171  
Seemingly in order to put an end to U.S. judicial action, UBS entered 
into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the U.S. Department of 
Justice on February 18, 2009.172 UBS, as part of the agreement, agreed to 
pay $780 million in fines, penalties, interest, and restitution for 
defrauding the U.S. government by helping U.S. taxpayers hide assets 
through UBS accounts held in the names of nominee or sham entities.173 
Two hundred million of the $780 million penalty was to be paid to the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to settle the charge of “acting 
as an unregistered broker-dealer and investment advisor” and 
enforcement action against the bank.174 Pursuant to the agreement, UBS 
waived the indictment and consented to the filing of one criminal count 
charging UBS with conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government and the 
IRS in violation of U.S. criminal law.175 The U.S. government agreed to 
recommend dismissal of the charge if UBS met all monetary and other 
obligations under the Deferred Prosecution Agreement.176 In an 
unprecedented move made to satisfy the agreement obligations, the 
Swiss Financial Markets Supervisor Authority disclosed to the U.S. 
government the identities of, and account information for, about two 
hundred and fifty U.S. customers of UBS’s cross-border business.177  
The ink had barely dried on the Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
before the U.S. government filed a civil suit on February 9, 2009 in a 
Miami federal district court against UBS to reveal the names of as many 
                                                     
170 See id. 
171 See Carlyn Kolker & Ryan J. Donmoyer, UBS Executive Weil Charged by U.S. in Tax 
Conspiracy, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601208&sid= 
a9920BUoGuF4.  
172 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, UBS Enters into Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-
136.html. See Brostek, supra note 10, at 10. See generally U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-
GOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), dismissed per stipulation, Agreement Between the 
U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009 WL 2524345 (2009). 
173 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 172. See Brostek, supra note 10, at 10. See generally U.S. v. 
UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), dismissed per 
stipulation, Agreement Between the U.S. & Swiss Confederation, 2009 WL 2524345 (2009).  
174 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 172 (stating that UBS also consented to the issuance of a 
final judgment that permanently enjoined the bank). 
175 See TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 7, at 32. 
176 Id. 
177 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 172. 
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as fifty-two thousand American customers.178 The Justice Department’s 
lawsuit alleged that the bank and the customers had conspired to defraud 
the IRS and the U.S. Federal Government of legitimately-owed tax 
revenue.179 The suit further alleged that the indicated customers had 
32,940 secret accounts containing cash and 20,877 accounts holding 
securities.180 The suit claimed that Swiss-based bankers actively 
marketed UBS’s services to wealthy U.S. customers within U.S. 
borders.181 Specifically, the government claimed that U.S. contacts 
occurred through UBS-sponsored sporting and cultural events that 
targeted wealthy Americans.182 UBS documents filed with the lawsuit 
show that UBS bankers came to the United States to meet with U.S. 
clients almost four thousand times a year, a clear violation of U.S. law.183 
The government stated that the bank trained its officers to avoid 
detection by U.S. authorities.184 In addition to the suit, the United States 
asked a federal judge to enforce the John Doe summons served upon 
UBS in July of 2008.185 
UBS, backed by the Swiss government, emphatically indicated it 
would withhold the names, calling the U.S. demand a “fishing 
expedition” that would breach bilateral tax agreements and Swiss bank 
secrecy laws.186 The bank believed it had a substantial defense to the 
enforcement of the John Doe summons and vocalized its intent to 
vigorously contest the enforcement of the summons in the civil 
proceeding, as permitted under the terms of the Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement.187 UBS claimed that the IRS’s summons sought information 
regarding a substantial number of undisclosed accounts maintained by 
U.S. citizens at UBS in Switzerland, whose information is protected by 
Swiss financial privacy laws.188 As breaching confidentiality is a criminal 
offense in Switzerland, to comply with the IRS’s summons would mean 
                                                     
178 See Sorkin, supra note 161. 
179 Id. 
180 See David Voreacos & Carlyn Kolker, U.S. Sues UBS Seeking Swiss Account Customer Names, 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 19, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=axZmpp36b_OA &refer; Browning, A 
2nd Inquiry Hits UBS, supra note 161. 
181 See Janet Levaux, UBS to Fight IRS Search of 52,000 Accounts, RESEARCH MAGAZINE, Feb. 19, 
2009, available at http://www.researchmag.com/News/2009/2/Pages/UBS-to-Fight-IRS-.aspx. 
182 See id. 
183 Id. 
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Swiss UBS employees would have to violate domestic law, resulting in 
criminal prosecutions in Switzerland.189 In response to the summons, the 
Swiss’s People’s Party called for retaliation against the United States and 
for urgent debate in Parliament on ways to protect Swiss banking secrecy 
from “further foreign blackmail.”190 
On March 4, 2009, the PSI held another hearing, called the Tax 
Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance—Obtaining the Names of U.S. 
Clients with Swiss Accounts (2009 PSI Hearing), directed at enforcing 
UBS compliance with the John Doe summons.191 According to John 
DiCicco, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division of the 
U.S Department of Justice, UBS’s challenge to the government’s motion 
to enforce the John Doe summons, including an appeal from an adverse 
ruling, would not be considered a breach of the previously signed 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement.192 However, if on completion of 
litigation the Court were to order UBS to produce the documents sought 
and hold UBS in contempt for failure to do so, UBS’s noncompliance 
may be determined to be a material breach of the Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement.193 If this were found to be the case, the U.S. government 
would be permitted to proceed with the criminal prosecution of UBS.194 
Mark Branson also testified at the 2009 PSI Hearing, but in support 
of UBS.195 Branson addressed the progress UBS had made under the 
requirements of the agreement.196 He stated that UBS had sought to 
comply with the John Doe summons without violating Swiss domestic 
law.197 According to Branson, Swiss privacy law prohibited UBS from 
producing responsive information located in Switzerland, which is why 
UBS had only been able to produce information responsive to the 
summons that was located in the United States.198 Branson stated that it 
was his belief that UBS had currently complied with the summons to the 
fullest extent possible without subjecting its employees to criminal 
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prosecution in Switzerland.199 He then emphasized that the United States’ 
continued pressure to enforce the summons would be a violation of the 
original 2001 QI agreement and the income tax treaty between the two 
countries.200 
This warning did not halt U.S. advances in seeking this 
information.201 On March 18, 2009, the Department of Justice extended 
its investigation into UBS offshore tax fraud to include independent 
attorneys and accountants in Switzerland and the United States.202 Of 
three individuals currently under investigation, one is a Zurich-based 
accountant who runs a boutique finance and trust company,203 and two 
are brothers who are attorneys at a law firm located in Zurich and 
Geneva.204 A criminal case is being built against these individuals, who 
are each suspected of having traveled with Swiss UBS bankers to the 
United States to work with American clients to evade U.S. taxes.205 On 
April 2, 2009, Steven Rubenstein of Boca Raton, Florida became the first 
U.S. citizen arrested in connection with the tax probe of UBS, allegedly 
hiding assets at UBS in order to avoid tax collectors.206 Rubenstein—a 
yacht company accountant—deposited more than $2 million in 
Kruggerrand gold coins into his UBS accounts and bought securities 
worth more than 4.5 million Francs.207 He is also accused of meeting 
with UBS Swiss bankers in several locations around South Florida from 
2001 to 2008.208 On August 10, 2009, Rubenstein signed a plea 
agreement with the Department of Justice consenting to these charges in 
exchange for lowered sentencing guidelines.209 
Fuel was added to the fire when Jeffrey Chernick of Stanfordville, 
New York, a representative for Hong Kong and Chinese toy 
manufacturers, pleaded guilty on July 28, 2009 to filing a false tax return 
by hiding $8 million through offshore accounts with UBS and another 
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unnamed Swiss bank.210 Chernick testified that for the past decade, he 
had used offshore accounts in the two banks expressly to avoid 
taxation.211 According to Chernick, the Swiss bankers removed his name 
and account numbers from his offshore account statements and lied to 
U.S. customs agents regarding their reasons for traveling to the United 
States.212 He also testified that there was a $45,000 bribe allegedly paid 
to a Swiss official on Chernick’s behalf in order to obtain information on 
the U.S. investigation into UBS.213 Court records document the 
extraordinary lengths Chernick went to avoid detection, including setting 
up a sham $700,000 loan between his company and a second Hong Kong 
entity to repatriate funds into the United States to purchase property for 
his home in New York.214  
C. Outcome 
With the trial date fast approaching, the U.S. government and UBS 
reported in a status conference meeting with U.S. District Judge Alan 
Gold that they had reached an “agreement in principle.”215 Terms were 
not immediately announced, and Judge Gold stated the parties would 
likely present a written breakdown at the August 7 status conference 
meeting with a final agreement to be approved by the court shortly 
thereafter.216 In accordance with the latest development, Judge Gold 
pushed the hearing date back to August 10 to give U.S. and UBS 
negotiators time to finalize a tentative agreement.217 
Swiss media reports from July 26 indicated U.S. negotiators 
expressed a willingness to accept data on a reduced number of accounts 
held by U.S. citizens.218 Under this reported plan, UBS would be 
required to reveal data only if the client had been visited by Swiss 
bankers outside the United States.219  
On August 12, 2009, the parties initialed a more substantive 
agreement, acknowledging it would “take a little time” to sign this 
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agreement in a final form.220 Lawyers involved in the case said the 
settlement could involve the disclosure of three thousand to more than 
ten thousand names of American clients suspected of using offshore 
accounts to evade taxes.221 Swiss banking authorities could disclose the 
names of investors in those accounts without breaching the country’s 
banking secrecy regime, which expressly carves out an exception for 
cases involving fraud.222 This “fraud exception” was the same principle 
cited when the bank previously disclosed the names of about two 
hundred and fifty UBS clients in conjunction with the Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement.223 Additionally, leaked details of what would be 
in the finalized agreement indicated that the UBS-U.S. settlement may 
prevent a monetary penalty from being levied against the bank.224 This is 
welcoming news to many investors who feared UBS would have to pay 
several billion dollars to settle the dispute.225 
V. ANALYSIS 
Switzerland, normally considered a bastion of banking secrecy, has 
come under heavy pressure from the United States, Germany, France, 
and Britain to improve practices relating to the enforcement and 
punishment of tax evaders.226 In response to this pressure, this Section 
addresses the changes to the current U.S.-Swiss TIEA,227 the future of 
Swiss banking privacy law and how it will affect U.S. offshore banking 
activity,228 and the character of policy decisions.229 
A. Likely Changes to the U.S.-Swiss TIEA 
Changes were bound to be made to the U.S.-Swiss TIEA given the 
enormous amount of civil and criminal litigation involving Swiss banks, 
coupled with the U.S. government’s unyielding commitment to eliminate 
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abusive offshore tax schemes and offshore accounts which lead to gross 
tax evasion.230 According to a June 19, 2009 Department of Treasury 
press release, the United States and Switzerland governments had 
concluded negotiations on an amended tax treaty.231 The countries were 
then expected to sign the protocol within a few months’ time,232 once 
Swiss business and local governments were given the chance to comment 
on the proposed changes.233 Switzerland’s Federal Council and 
Parliament will decide if the new agreement is permitted to take effect.234 
The Obama Administration is focused on pushing initiatives to close 
loopholes that have allowed U.S. investors to evade taxes using offshore 
havens, signaling this amendment stands a good chance of being enacted 
by U.S. lawmakers.235 The amendments would revise the existing U.S.-
Swiss treaty to allow for a greater exchange of information as permitted 
by a model tax convention adopted by the Paris-based Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).236  
B. Future of Swiss Banking Privacy Vis-à-Vis The United States 
The United States’ case against UBS has strained relations between 
the United States and Switzerland because of the blatant challenge to 
Switzerland’s diligently guarded banking secrecy laws.237 While the 
settlement could be viewed as good news for UBS regarding the U.S. 
legal battleground, the bank could be facing an attack on the home front 
when the dust finally settles in America.238 In disclosing names, UBS 
could face more civil suits from account holders claiming that UBS 
violated Swiss bank secrecy laws by including their names and account 
information in any disclosure.239 UBS employees may also face criminal 
prosecution under Swiss law for breaching confidentiality.240 All of this 
is likely to cause significant political backlash in Switzerland to defend 
its sovereignty, especially as it relates to the United States. 
The banking sector is such a large employer in Switzerland, and such 
a strong source of pride among the Swiss population, that no Swiss 
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government can eliminate these laws without severe political 
repercussions. As such, the political system is likely to continue to 
respond to the rising political pressure in Switzerland to defend its 
sovereignty and its domestic banking secrecy laws. Swiss Foreign 
Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey understands this, and, in response to the 
UBS litigation, stated, “It is about Switzerland’s sovereignty. We want 
our laws to be respected. It is also about our financial centers and about 
jobs.”241 Thus, the government will likely continue to strengthen its bank 
secrecy violation penalties on the one hand, while on the other doing as 
little as possible to placate the United States with respect to U.S. citizens 
with unreported Swiss accounts.  
The Swiss judicial system is also very likely to take umbrage to the 
United States’ attempt to abrogate its laws. The reaction could include 
strict and severe enforcement of bank secrecy violation penalties and 
criminal sentences. Historically, the Swiss judiciary has often looked at 
the application of U.S. laws by U.S. judges to U.S. citizens doing 
business in Switzerland as interference with domestic sovereignty, rather 
than a proper application of U.S. laws. However, where a U.S. case has 
involved the fraudulent conduct of a wealthy American citizen, the Swiss 
Courts have been somewhat compliant. In this case, the United States is 
seeking to enforce its laws in Switzerland on American citizens who 
have properly obtained their wealth, but who have fraudulently not 
reported such wealth for U.S. tax purposes. As such, the United States is 
attempting to broaden the Swiss idea of fraud beyond what Swiss courts 
would normally consider under their definition of “fraud.” The Swiss 
courts are very likely to push back against such a broad application. 
C. Is this Good Policy? 
This litigation is likely to create changes to offshore banking 
opportunities and banking secrecy laws in addition to the revised U.S.-
Swiss TIEA. The United States appears to have changed the status quo. 
The question remains whether this outcome reflects sound policy. This 
Section discusses the effects of this policy, both in terms of interfering 
with another country’s sovereignty,242 and the true purpose and effect of 
bringing the UBS case. 
i. Meddling in other countries’ sovereignty 
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The United States today seems to interpret its national interest in 
terms of projection of U.S. power overseas in addition to protecting its 
own borders. This foreign projection has extended from military power 
to taxing power. The United States also runs an enormous budget deficit. 
Since it has one of the few “worldwide taxation” systems, the United 
States has the power to locate all assets of all citizens that may produce 
income to ensure compliance of its tax laws. The budget deficit puts 
pressure on tax collectors to do so by any means necessary. This has lead 
the United States to take the position, as in the UBS case, that U.S. 
taxing authority trumps domestic legal authority in foreign jurisdictions 
like Switzerland.  
During the Iraq War, Belgian lawmakers took a similar position by 
seeking to indict high-level U.S. government officials, including the 
Secretary of Defense. On a financial level, nothing stands in the way of 
another sovereign country passing laws, in the name of its national 
interest, that would interfere with American citizens’ rights.  In a world 
that is increasingly connected, the United States cannot afford to 
abrogate other countries’ laws, especially the laws of a friendly country 
like Switzerland. After all, other countries could review the U.S. position 
in the UBS case and determine they have the right to pass a law that its 
citizens need not pay U.S. taxes on U.S. source income. If the United 
States can effect a domestic law change that affects a foreign sovereign’s 
domestic laws, there is no reason that another country could not do the 
same to the United States. It is not in the United States’ national interest 
to stand alone in the world with a position that it need not respect foreign 
laws, but that other sovereign nations must respect U.S. laws. 
ii. True purpose of the UBS case and effect  
On the surface, the reason that the United States brought the UBS 
case appears to have been to identify the names of American citizens 
who had unreported foreign bank accounts overseas at UBS. The United 
States, however, probably had a much broader purpose in bringing the 
case. The broader purpose was probably to have a deterrent effect on 
foreign banks and advisors who assist in creating or facilitating foreign 
bank accounts. The myriad network of non-U.S. banks, other financial 
institutions, advisors, and other facilitators (collectively referred to as the 
“Network”) is so deep and vast that there is no way that the United States 
could effectively bring actions and enforce its laws against even a small 
fraction of the Network. As such, putting UBS personnel in prison and 
exacting a very large fine against UBS was the first, and most important, 
step in the process. Following that step, incentivizing U.S. taxpayers to 
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voluntarily come forward was the next most important step because it 
had the effect of making the Network aware that U.S. taxpayers may 
come forward even without punishing the Network itself. The totality of 
the U.S. attack is such that many foreign banks will no longer accept 
American citizens as clients. Whereas the common wisdom offshore 
used to be that the IRS could not reach foreign jurisdictions to reach the 
Network, today the opposite conclusion is widely believed. Thus, as long 
as the United States continues its attack, the deterrent goal will likely be 
met.  
Obviously, the more press the United States receives about cracking 
down on offshore account holders and the Network, the more of a 
deterrent effect there will be on American citizens who might otherwise 
contemplate opening up an unreported foreign bank account. If the IRS 
and the U.S. government are able get the names of U.S. accountholders 
at UBS, this could be a very large weapon in the U.S. government’s 
arsenal.243 Lastly, with increased scrutiny of offshore accounts, owners 
may have limited access to their money.244 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States had a very important goal in bringing the UBS 
case: deterring taxpayers from opening unreported foreign bank accounts 
and deterring foreign banks and advisors from assisting U.S. taxpayers in 
doing so. The PSI report spelled out that American citizens have made 
extensive use of offshore tax havens to evade taxes, and that traditional 
law enforcement is unable to control such misconduct.245 It makes sense 
that the largest offshore banking jurisdiction with bank secrecy laws—
Switzerland—would be the initial target of the U.S. probe. In 
conjunction with the criminal and civil probe of UBS, it also stands to 
reason that the United States would seek to get a more favorable TIEA in 
place with Switzerland.246  
The problem with the United States’ attack on UBS is not its goals, 
but rather its methods. The United States has traditionally been steadfast 
in protecting itself from encroachment by laws of other sovereign nations 
that contradict U.S. laws. Given this position, the United States appears 
to be trying to have it both ways with the rest of the world—other 
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countries must follow U.S. laws but they should not attempt to make the 
United States follow their laws. Given this contradiction, it is 
understandable that the Swiss are concerned that the United States is not 
respecting Swiss domestic law. The United States, after all, has personal 
jurisdiction over its own citizens, and therefore should be able to use 
other means of tax enforcement that respect the domestic laws of another 
sovereign country, especially Switzerland.  
